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ABSTRACT 
This study provides the first empirical evidence on the effects of the intellectual property 
rights and threat of imitation on Australian export flows. Using data from Australia’s all 
trading partners over the period 1995 to 2010 an augmented gravity is estimated in the 
context of an unbalanced panel. The empirical findings show that level of intellectual 
property rights of importing countries and threat of imitation posed by the importing 
countries are both sensitive to the Australian bilateral trade flows. These results, therefore, 
support the widely accepted positive nexus between the importance of intellectual property 
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The issue of intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection is gaining worldwide 
importance as economies move increasingly towards knowledge-based activities 
(Fink and Braga, 1999). Furthermore, the attention paid by trade economists to IPRs 
issues has recently increased especially after the inclusion of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in the system of the World 
Trade Organization (Qui and Yu, 2010). Indeed, for the last two decades, the nature of 
linkages between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and international trade flows has 
been a source of much debate and controversy (Awokuse et al., 2010; Lerner, 2009). 
The debate is stimulated by the mixed empirical results of the effects of level of 
intellectual property rights on trade flows (Ivus, 2010). 
The tension over strengthening IPRs stem from the fact that knowledge is non-
rival in consumption (Arrow, 1962) and hence should be available free, but to 
produce such goods in the first place sufficient incentives need to be given to the 
innovators by way of intellectual property protection. As IPRs related laws differ 
across countries, it is of considerable interest from policy perspective to learn how 
changing the IPRs policies across countries or harmonizing them through multilateral 
initiatives, affect the cross country flow of goods and services that are embedded with 
invisible intellectual property element. Although there are a number of studies that 
have analysed the links between their protection and economic welfare, economic 
growth, innovations, FDI, and technology transfer
2
 a little empirical work has been 
done to directly investigate the relationship between export response and the IPRs 
protection in the destination countries. 
                                               
1 We are grateful to the anonymous referees and the editor of this journal for valuable comments and 
suggestions which tremendously improved the quality and presentation of the paper. However, the 
authors only are responsible for any remaining error. 
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Therefore, this study contributes to the existing literature by providing 
empirical evidence on the effects of the IPRs strength on bilateral exports of 
Australia. Furthermore, the study introduces a threat of imitation variable based on the 
research and development expenditure of the importers and interact this variable with 
the IPRs standard of the importers to empirically evaluate if the imitation threats in 
the destination countries matter for Australian exports. These issues have been 
investigated after controlling for the gravity related variables of trade and the country 
development status of the importers.  
The organization of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 explains the link 
between intellectual property rights (IPRs), threat of imitation and trade flows. 
Empirical specification, methods and data are presented in Section 3. Section 4 
presents the empirical results and analysis. The conclusions and some policy 
considerations are presented in the final section of the paper. 
2. IPRs, Threat of Imitation and Trade Flows: A Link 
The existing IPRs literature has identified two key channels through which status of 
the IPRs protection in a destination country affects the behaviour of foreign exporting 
firms when exporting to the destination country. The first of these is the “market 
expansion effect”, and the second is the “market power effect”. These effects explain 
how foreign exporting firms might react to a change of IPRs in an importing 
destination country. The market expansion effect is defined as a case in which strong 
foreign IPRs protection expands exports markets by ensuring exclusive rights to sell 
in the protected exports (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995). An exporting firm may be 
expected to increase its sales (exports) to an importing country with strong IPRs 
protection and thereby expand its market for two reasons. Firstly, the exclusive rights 
provided to its exported goods through such strong protection reduce the capacity of 
local firms in a destination country to imitate the imported goods. The result is that 
the demand faced by the exporting firm is effectively shifted outward and larger sales 
volumes ensue. Secondly, strong IPRs protection in a destination country reduces the 
potential cost that may otherwise be incurred by foreign exporting firms in that it 
prevents the possible loss of their technologies to firms in the destination country. 




availability of imitated products and the added burden of making products more 
difficult to reproduce
3
 (Smith, 1999, 2002; Taylor, 1993).  
Alternatively, a foreign exporting firm may choose to react negatively to the 
strong IPRs protection in a destination country by restricting the quantity of its 
exports and increasing the unit price. This is known as the “market power effect” 
(Maskus & Penubarti, 1995). There are also two reasons for a foreign exporting firm 
reacting negatively to strong IPRs protection in a destination country. Firstly, the 
market power that arises from such protection in an importing country causes the 
elasticity of demand facing the exporting firm to decrease. As a result, the exporting 
firm may choose to decrease its exports and increase its unit price in order to profit 
from the increased monopoly rents. Secondly, strong IPRs protection in an importing 
country raises the cost of imitation for local firms. It also raises their marginal cost 
because of measures required to avoid detection by the relevant regulatory authorities. 
Here, too, the exporting firm is encouraged to act monopolistically by reducing its 
exports to the destination country (Smith 1999, 2002).  
It is also possible that strong IPRs change the preference structure of MNCs in 
favour of licensing and FDI activities and reduce incentive for direct arm’s length 
exporting. Ferrantino (1993) shows that, countries with strong IPRs act to increase 
economic distance and thereby reduce international trade flows. However, the author 
finds transfer exports or export from parent to affiliate firms to rise in countries with 
weak IPRs. This finding weakens the argument that strong patent protection in the 
developing countries helps to protect the interest of the developed country firms and 
workers, especially when the cost of technology transfer from the parent to foreign 
affiliates is higher. Strong IPRs policies in the developing countries are likely to lead 
to vertical disintegration of the foreign firms. From the perspective of the developing 
countries, intra-firm trade among foreign firms may not be desirable in that it may 
involve tax-evasion through transfer pricing.  
The market power and market expansion effects seem to offset each other; 
therefore, no clear theoretical prediction can be made about the impacts on the 
direction of trade in a world of varying IPRs protection regimes. All that can be 
                                               
3 The case in which exports of a firm are the consequence of strong IRPs protection in a destination 
country and the associated reduction in private expenditures to deter imitation by firms in a destination 





inferred from the existing theory is that the pattern of a country’s exports across 
importing countries depends on the relative importance of these two effects (Smith, 
1999, 2002; Rafiquzzaman, 2002; Yang and Huang, 2009; Kazutaka,, 2012). 
Moreover, changes in the IPRs policies in the destination countries affect the 
behaviour of multinational firms in terms of their mode of serving the export market 
(Ferrantino, 1993). It is not certain how they will restructure their FDI, licensing and 
arm’s length export policies in the new IPRs regime. 
If imitative capacities of the trading partner (i.e. importing partner) are well 
developed due to large supply of scientists and engineers and high R&D spending, 
then in the absence of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), firms in the exporting 
country might be reluctant to sell (export) their goods under these conditions. 
Therefore, the imitative ability of the trading partner and its level of IPRs should be 
both taken into account in determining the ability of the importing country to imitate 
the imported goods. A country with high capacities to imitate (e.g. China), constitute 
a threat to other exporting countries that wants to export to China. Therefore, the 
presence and enforcement of IPRs in China is likely to be more important than in the 
case for a developing country such as Bangladesh which characterized by week 
imitative ability to imitate the imported goods. The imitative ability variable is 
measured in the literature by the percentage of R&D expenditure to GDP (Smith, 
1999). 
While there have been useful modelling exercises in trade flows and IPRs 
linkages, there is hardly any application to Australia. However, there are few studies 
that analyse Australia’s trade flows and trade competitiveness using the augmented 
gravity modelling. For example, Anderson (1995) examines Australia’s changing 
trade pattern and growth performance and analyses the role of regional and global 
trade liberalization in affecting their changing trend in trade. Findlay and Song (1996) 
also analyse bilateral trade potential between Australia and china and argue that future 
bilateral trade between these two countries would continue to be driven by each 
country’s comparative advantage. Sheng and Song (2008) examines the determinants 
of bilateral trade between Australia and China at the two digit commodity levels and 
demonstrate that current bilateral trade between these countries tends to promote the 
welfare of both countries in terms of generating more value added from exports. The 
most recent study conducted by Rahman (2012) demonstrates that Australia’s bilateral 




language, and negatively by the distance between the trading partners. The author also 
show that Australia has tremendous trade potential with Singapore, Argentina, the 
Russian Federation, Portugal, Greece, Chile, the Philippines, Norway, Brazil and 
Bangladesh. Whether this potential will still exist after imposing strong IPRs regime 
or their imitation threat status is certainly an interesting area of research. 
The aforementioned discussion leads us to conclude that the question of 
whether strong IPRs in the importing countries would lead to increased imports or not 
from their import sources is a purely empirical question that can be answered through 
the empirical investigation only. In this regard, Australia is a suitable case study. 
Since the IPRs index covers among others the patentability of foods, plant and animal 
varieties, and Australia is a major exporter of these items, it is worthwhile to know 
how the varying strengths of the IPRs policies in the export market affects her export 
flows. Moreover, as both the developed and the developing countries, holding a wide 
spectrum of IPRs policies, are Australia’s trading partners, the result obtained from 
the analysis will have more general applicability. 
3. Data, Methodology and Empirical Specification  
The study utilizes data from Australia’s all trading partners over the period 1995 to 
2010. Since the IPRs data are available only at five years interval and data for the 
R&D expenditure are not available before 1995, four cross-sections, 1995, 2000, 
2005, and 2010 have been selected for the study. The panel dataset has 830 
observations and 223 countries that attract positive import from Australia. The 
countries with which Australia has export relationship with and their numbers vary 
over the years, and hence the dataset is an unbalanced panel. 
The annual exports from Australia to her trading partners are from the UN 
COMTRADE database and the GDP data for the relevant countries are from the 
online database of the World Bank. The Geographical distance data (Dij) are obtained 
from a geo-distance database CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectiveset d’Information 
Internationales), which is available at the www.cepii.com site. For the IPRs index, we 
have relied on two sources: the Ginerte-Park (1997) index for the period 1995 to 2005 
and the Property Rights Alliance published, Property Rights Index 2010 Report, for 
the year 2010. These choices are based on data availability. The construction 
procedures for the IPRs indexes are slightly different in these two sources and they 




from 0 to 10. In both cases, however, the higher value of the index implies higher 
IPRs protection. For conformity, the latter index was converted into the 0 to 5 scale 
by the formula, (IPR*5)/10. 
The tariffs are expressed as the simple mean of the most favoured nation 
(MFN) rates applied on all commodities, and are obtained from the World 
Development Indicators of the online database of the World Bank (http://databank.-
worldbank.org/). The research and development (R&D) expenditure data, measured as 
the percentage of GDP, are from the UNESCO data centre (http://stats.-
uis.unesco.org/). The source does not have any data on the R&D for any country 
before 1995. Inclusion of this variable in the construction of the imitation threat 
dummy has forced us to restrict our sample size from 1995 to 2010. Summary 
information about all the variables used in the study is provided in Table 1. From a 
cursory view of the table it can be surmised that, all of variables are non-normal and, 
except for the negatively skewed distance variable, all other variables are right-
skewed and have distributions with positive kurtosis. Since the GDP, per capita GDP, 
and the R&D are positively skewed, the countries with the below average income and 
below average R&D expenditure in the sample attract the higher amount of bilateral 
exports from Australia.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Selected Variables  
Variables 
Statistics 
Xij Yi Yj YPj Dij IPRj RDj 
Mean 481.4 692.3 232.5 8863 12544 2.94 1.06 
Standard 
Deviation 
2748.3 307.2 1009.4 
14019 4117 
0.97 0.97 
Skewness 12.94 0.66 9.23 2.66 -0.93 0.06 1.24 


















Note: Variables: Xij – Exports (Millions of US dollars), Yi – Exporter’s (Australia’s) GDP (Billions of 
US dollars), Yj – Importers’ GDP (Billions of US dollars), YPj – Importers’ Per Capita GDP (US 
dollars), Dij – Bilateral Distance (Kilometres), IPRj – Importers’ IPRs Index (0 to 5 scale), RDj – 
Research and Development Expenditure (Percentage of GDP). 1Jarque-Berra statistics (p-value in 
parenthesis)  
Many observations on the IPRs index and the R&D variables for the selected 




countries have information on other variables, multiple imputation method, as 
suggested in Honaker et al (2011), has been used to infer about the missing data. The 
technique involves specifying a conditional predictive distribution for the missing 
values based on the observed data, and then drawing values from the posterior 
distribution, 
    MMM dZZZfZZfZf )|(,|| 000   , 
where θ is the parameter vector of the distribution. ZO and ZM are respectively the sets 
of observed and missing values in the data matrix. In our sample the R&D and the 
IPRs variable have many missing values. As part of the post-imputation diagnostic, 
the distributions of the observed and imputed data for these two variables are reported 
in Figure 1. Though the distributions for the imputed values do not perfectly 
synchronize with the distributions for the observed values for these two variables,  
Figure 1: Comparison of the distributions of the observed  
and the imputed data 























































they certainly have an impulse to lean toward the observed distributions. As these 
imputed data are randomly generated from predictive distributions of the variables, 
they are amenable to undergo any statistical procedure like the observed data. 
Inclusion of the imputed data with the observed data has been found to improve the 
precision of the estimates.  
The analysis of the study is based on an augmented version of the gravity 








model can be traced back to the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) paper, where the 
equations of the model are derived from theoretical foundations, and the idea of 
multilateral resistance to trade is introduced. The implication of the model is that, two 
trading partners’ bilateral trade depends not only on their bilateral resistances (such 
as, tariffs, distance, IPRs, etc), but also on their obstacles to trade with other trading 
partners. In other words, it is the relative barriers that matters for bilateral trade. The 












































































iijij tP  
The term ijt is the unobserved border effect, and i and jP are the multilateral 
prices, also unobserved. Solving model (1) requires customized non-linear program. 
There are, however, some simpler alternatives to solving the complicated non-linear 
equation. Baier and Bergstrand (2009), for example, propose a linearized version of 
the model based on an approximation from the Taylor series expansion. Their 
extensive Monte-Carlo experiments show that the results from the linear and non-
linear versions of these models are quite close. Feenstra (2004), and Baldwin and 
Taglioni (2006) suggest for incorporating country fixed effects for importers and 
exporters in the gravity equation to control for the multilateral resistance term. This 
latter approach is simpler and we follow it without the exporter fixed effect, as our 

















Where ijtX  is the annual export of country i (here Australia) to its trading 
partner j in year t. The basic gravitational variables that appear as independent 
variables in this study are market sizes of the trading partners (Yit and Yjt) and the 




what variables should be included in the model and how they need to be measured. As 
a guideline, Shephard (2012) suggests that the dependent variable should be the log of 
bilateral exports, not total trade, and GDPs be measured in nominal terms, not in real 
terms. The two unobserved multilateral price terms, Pi and Πj, included in the model 
effectively deflate the data. It is not even appropriate to include the observed price 
indices in the model.  
Two categorical variables have been created to examine how their various 
levels affect the Australian exports, and how they interact with the IPRs of the 
importers in modifying the response of these export flows. The first one is the 
imitation threat with two levels: strong and weak. It is believed that countries that 
spend more on research have better capabilities to make counterfeit products. To 
discover if there is any threshold point in the R&D expenditure beyond which 
countries are in the strong imitative ability group, the following regression equation is 
fitted: 
ijtjjtijt RDIRDZX   )()()ln()3(  
where  is the regime switching point in the research and expenditure variable 
(RDj) and Z includes all other independent controls used in equation (2). I(.) is an 
indicator function that equals one if the condition inside the bracket is satisfied and 
zero otherwise. The equation is estimated using the Muggeo (2003) proposed 
segmented regression method, whereby a broken line relationship is fitted to the data 
to find the break point. The application of this method yields an estimated breakpoint 
near 0.64 with a standard error of 0.18 and hence the breakpoint is statistically 
significant. The imitation capability dummy is created based on this cut-off point. 
Countries in the strong imitation threat (ST) group have R&D expenditure above 0.64 
per cent of their GDPs while others are in the weak imitation threat group. As a 
robustness check, the cut-off point has also been taken as the medium value of the 
R&D expenditure and the results are compared.  
The second categorical variable is the development status of the countries 
based on their per capita income. World Bank followed classifications for income 
groups are used here for this purpose. Countries with per capita income of US$ 1,025 
or less are considered in the low income group, per capita income in the range of US$ 
1,026 to 12,475 are in the middle income (MI) group, and with per capita income 




and the low income group are treated as the reference categories, against which the 
influences of the other categories are evaluated.   
4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
For analysing the effect of the IPRs protection and its potential interaction with the 
imitation threat status of the importers, model (2) has been estimated first without the 
imitation threat dummy (Model 2a) and then with the imitation threat dummy (Model 
2b). The empirical results from these two models are reported in Table 2 for both the 
imputed and the observed-only dataset. The model fit statistics, adjusted R
2
, reported 
at the bottom of the table indicate that both datasets fit the model well. However the 
degrees of freedom are severely reduced in the dataset with missing observations, and 
coefficients on some of the variables such as the distance and importers’ income 
status turn out as insignificant. The problem is that, though these two variables rarely 
have missing observations, unavailability of many observations on the R&D 
expenditure and the IPRs variables (around 72 per cent and 42 per cent of the 
observations are missing for the R&D and the IPRs of the importers in the sample) 
force list-wise deletion on the dataset and waste valuable information inherent in other 
variables. The results of the model are hence explained in terms of the imputed 
dataset and the results from the observed dataset are reported alongside for 
comparison purpose only.  
The coefficient estimates are accompanied below them by their cluster-robust 
standard errors. As the export flows are considered over periods, some country pairs 
appear several times in the dataset. The error terms for such set of country pairs are 
likely to be correlated. These observations have been treated as a group on the basis of 
their distance and the cluster robust standard errors are reported for the estimated 
coefficients. Generally, the overall performances of the basic gravity variables are 
quite satisfactory in terms of their statistical significance and econometric 
interpretation. While geographical distance reduces total trade, greater market sizes of 
both the source and the destination countries expand them. Exporter’s income has 
stronger impact than importers’ income (0.70 versus 0.47) in the estimated export 
trade flow equation and their combined effect is higher than one. Thus it can be 





Table 2:  Estimation Results  
(Dependent Variable: Log of Total Export) 
Variables Description 
Imitation Threat at RDj = 0.64 Imitation Threat at the median RDj 
Imputed Dataset Observed Dataset Imputed Dataset Observed Dataset 

















































































































































































 --- 0.91 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.91 0.91 0.94 
0.95 
Notes:  ** and * indicate statistically significant estimates at 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels respectively.  





The main interest of this paper is to determine whether the bilateral exports of 
Australia are sensitive to the differences in IPRs protection in the destination 
countries, and the extent to which the imitation threat interacts with the IPRs variable 
in affecting Australian exports. Since model (2a) does not have the imitation threat 
status dummy in it, the coefficient of the IPRs in this model reflect the impact of the 
IPRs strength of all countries in the sample on the export flow of Australia. The 
estimated coefficient 0.17 is significant at the conventional 5 per cent level, implying 
that a one point higher score of the importers in the IPRs scale can lead to about 17 
per cent increase in bilateral exports from Australia. Thus the result suggests the 
dominance of the market expansion effect of the IPRs strength of the importers for 
Australian exports. 
However, the presence of imitation threat in terms of the importers’ R&D 
expenditure (Model 2b) does not seem to have any statistically significant effect on 
Australia’s bilateral exports. The combination of strong imitation threat and high IPRs 
is similarly insignificant in affecting Australian exports. In case of the country income 
status, both the high income group and the medium income group import more, by 
about 44 per cent and 49 per cent respectively, compared to the low income group. 
Since many trading partners of Australia are developing countries and come from the 
middle income group, the result conforms to the findings of Maskus and Penubarti 
(1995) who also show that the effect of patent protection is stronger in developing 
countries. 
China, the top ranking trading partner of Australia, has around one per cent of 
GDP in the research and development expenditure and is showing rising IPR index 
over time in the sample. China’s bilateral trade with Australia is also positively 
responding at the same time. Similar explanation applies for trade between Australia 
and India. Whatever may be the level of imitation threat, when considered as a whole, 
the regression result shows that it is in the interest of Australia to have strong IPRs 
protection in the partner trading countries. Presence of the imitation threat and its 
interaction with the IPRs do not matter. However, in the context of US manufacturing 
data Smith (1999) presents a mixed result by showing that patent right barriers 
adversely affect trade for high imitation threat group but increases trade with low or 




It is not surprising to find that a non-high technology product exporter like 
Australia enjoys positive export response from higher IPRs protection in the 
destination countries. In a cross section of 89 countries, Fink and Braga (2005), for 
example, find that non-fuel category aggregate export responds positively while high 
technology product suffers from higher IPRs in the partner countries. Their argument 
is that high technology firms may have tendencies to exploit market power and serve 
foreign market through FDI when IPRs in the importing countries are stronger. Stern 
(1987) argues that making IPRs regime strong is similar to removing non-tariff 
barriers. Exporters have to worry less about the counterfeiting of their products and 
can reduce expenditure on making the product less imitable. 
The influence of intellectual property rights in positively affecting trade flow 
is in conformity with the growing importance of knowledge based economy. 
According to an estimate of the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the value of 
intellectual property in Australia in 2010-2011 was worth $182.5 billion and trade 
royalties associated with intellectual property amounted to $1.1 billion and $5.2 
billion from export and import respectively (Department of foreign Affairs and Trade, 
2012). Moreover, it is often argued that intellectual property policy reforms in 
developing countries can raise their inward foreign direct investment flow (Park, 
2008) and increase imports by the affiliates from their mother countries. There is, 
however, a fear among the developing countries that their technologies are mostly 
imitative and adoptive in nature and hence strong IPRs in the home countries would 
imply benefiting foreign firms in the developed countries at the expense of the local 
firms in the developing countries. Since strict property right and innovation activities 
are complementary (Schneider, 2005) supporting research and development activities 
in the developing countries by the developed world can result in a win-win situation.  
5. Conclusion 
An explicit econometric analysis of the relationship between the level of intellectual 
property rights, imitation threat, income status, and bilateral export flows from 
Australia to her trading partners has been performed, and the notion that the level of 
intellectual property rights stimulate bilateral export flows from Australia has been 
supported. In particular, the results show that stronger IPRs regimes irrespective of 




concerned. The results are based on about 830 observations on Australia’s trading 
partners, spread over four cross sections, and should be credible.  
Positive relationship between the IPRs in the importing country and the 
exports flows to that country has important policy implications for reducing 
knowledge gaps between the developed and the developing countries. Instead of 
letting the developing countries follow the learning-by-imitating strategy, in a lax 
IPRs environment, knowledge transfer should take place through direct technical 
assistance. Countries that are beneficiaries of the strong IPRs regime can share their 
gains by allowing the affected countries increased market access through special tariff 
concessions like the generalized system of preferences. This will make the goal of 
achieving higher IPRs standard and increased export flow simultaneously easier. 
Alternatively, technology transfer can take place through increased FDI activities and 
building institution (research and training) to enhance the absorptive capacity of the 
host countries. 
The study is, however, Australia focused and based on aggregate trade data 
that might conceal various response patterns to property rights reform depending on 
industry categories. Future research in this area can replicate similar analysis based on 
more extensive datasets and use industry-specific data, which will help to check 
whether the results of the present study are representative. Another important 
dimension of the IPRs policy changes, namely, its effects on the welfare of the source 
and destination countries or the world as a whole, was not covered in the study. 
Obviously, there are payoffs from directing future research attention in this highly 
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